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Introduction
Philip Foster opened a recent paper with the statement: "Few would
disagree with the observation that the schools and universities of sub-Saharan 
Africa are perhaps the cost important contemporary mechanise of stratification 
and redistribution on the continent."1 There are, of course, very serious 
disputes about the nature of the interaction between the education system and 
the broad social and political structure, and the role that formal schooling 
plays in the reproduction and evolution of social classes. Many wcell ^rgue
that a focus on the education system is superficial, since the education
3 ystec only reflects the policy of the groups controlling the State apparatus, 
and that an understanding of "stratification and redistribution" can only be 
achieved through a political economy analysis of the state in class vercs.^ 
These disputes are important, since they concern our understandirr rf :br 
'deep* structures of society and the underlying, as opposed to turf.ee, 
mechanisms generating social structure. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
understand in detail the nature of the role formal education structures play 
in terms of stratification and redistribution in narrower senses, such as the 
purely economic. .Very few such detailed case studies exist, although most 
observers have general notions of Che probable qualitative results of the 
interaction.-^ These qualitative expectations are thac, ou an 
intra-generational basis, the education systea in sub-Saharar. Africa has a
i
disequalizing effect on income distribution.
This qualitlative expectation is based on the interaction of three 
observations: (1) that public expenditures on schooling per student-year
v
r escalate rapidly as students roove up through the system, so chat typically in 
sub-Saharan Africa a university student benefits from about 100 times as much 
public subsidy as a primary school student^, (2) that enrollment ratios 
fall rapidly as one moves up the system, so that secondary enrollments are 
typically or.ly 10 to 111 of primary, and tertiary enrollments only 2 to 
5T of secondary-*, and (3) the rate of return to investment in education, 
although it tends to fall as one moves up through the system, does not fall 
nearly fast enough to offset the greater per-student subsidy.^
If one adds a fourth observation, namely that the children of the better 
off are typically overrepresented at the higher levels of the educational 
system, one obtains a basis for two further qualitative results, namely that 
the educational system does not display ex-post equality of opportunity, and 
is serving to reproduca inequalities from one generation to the next. This 
ia3t observation may or may not involve, in a strict sense, intergenarational' 
disequalizing, depending on the incidence of the tax system generating the 
revenues used for public expenditure on education, and the criterion used to 
define inequality of benefit and cosc incidence.^
This paper attempts to spell out in detail the mechanisms of this general 
process in a particular country, namely Lesotho in the mid 1970's. Lesotho 
provides a useful case-study because of the unusually extreme nature of the 
labor market side of the process. For a mixture of historic, political, and 
geographic reasons, one can make very strong assumptions about the • 
relationships between formal educational attainments and labor incomes with 
considerable confidence. In what follows, data will be presented on three 
elements ia the mechanism we are discussing: (1) the nature of the labor
market and the links between educational attainments and initial wage or 
salary levels; (2) the cost and enrollment structures of the formal 
educational system; and (3) the socio-economic origins of university students 
compared to the population a3 a whole. After presenting these data, their
)
implications for income distribution will be discussed, together with some 
suggestions about possible policy changes.
Labor in Lesotho
As in cost less developed countries Cldc’s), the labor situation ir.
Lesotho is difficult to describe in precise quantitative terms sir.-e, apart 
from data shortages, most domestic economic activity is organized in informal 
enterprises, often coinciding with households, and considerable ambiguity 
consequently surrounds the labor force status of nany individuals 
(particularly rural females, the young, and the aged). Only a relatively 
small minority of the total population aged 15-64 years are employed for veges 
on a regular basis within Lesotho -approximately 4 to 5X in the mid 1970s.
This proportion is, however, net unusually low for East and Centra1 Africa 
-in 1968 the ratio of number employed for wages to total population was 2.ST 
in Tanzania and 3.5Z in Uganda.® On the other hand, Lesotho is very unusual 
in that an extremely high proportion of the male labor force is ncrmwl.lv 
absent from the country in employment in the Republic of South Africa (RCA). 
For complex institutional and historic reasons, all estimates of the numbers 
of migrant workers from Lesotho in RSA should be treated with considerable 
caution, but Table I includes the “be3t-guess" estimates available.^ The bulk 
of the migrants are male, relatively uneducated, and work in the void, ccal,
i
diamond, aud other ainen of RSA. Both male and female migrants work, often on
a seasonal basis, in relatively unskilled jobs in agriculture in RSA. Many of 
the female migrants also work in domestic service in RSA. However, soma 
migrants from Lesotho, both mala and female, are found in all sectors of the 
RSA economy. Quantitatively, the skill-nix and educational background of 
migrants outside mining are essentially unknown, but it is clear that in soma 
sectors, e.g. the construction trades, migrants often include skilled 
workers.
Within Lesotho, the growth of full-time, regular wage employment has boon 
relatively slow in the 1970*3 and ouch slower than the growth of tho labor 
force. In the mid 1970's about 15,000 more people reached age 15 each year 
than reached age 65, whereas regular wage employment in the modern sector in 
Lesotho increased by only between 2,000 and 3,000 a year, with about half the 
increase in Government itself (including teaching in Government).
Nevertheless, Lesotho was still suffering from a severe 3kill shortage, with 
many expatriates still employed and large numbers of vacant posts in 
government at levels requiring technical training or higher education.
The result of this situation is that we can be relatively confident of the 
expected income of new entrants to the labor force on the basi3 of their 
educational qualifications. Initial placement in the public service depended 
on educational qualifications only, and the initial salary levels arc shown in 
Table 2. For comparison, cash wages for novice underground mineworkers in the 
second half of 1975 in RSA were R57.20 a month, with the surface minimum 
R36.A0 a month*^; by 1973 thesa rates had increased to R76.70 and R5Q.70 
respectively.1* Average cash wages of African nineworkers in RSA were
considerably higher, at R.79 and R126 monthly in 1975 and August 1573 
respectively.
There were no educational qualifications for migrant mine work, in RSA, 
only physical onea. Admittedly, oinework in unpleasant, physically demanding 
and dangerous, involves separation from families, and requires life under the 
apartheid South African regime. Nevertheless, remembering that mine 
employment involves free board, lodging, and medical care in addition to cash
i
wages, if wa focus on pecuniary returns only the implications are striking.
In 1975, even a novice minavorktr on the surface could earn the I.^otho 
minimum wage in 9.9 months, while an underground novice could earn the 
starting salary of a recruit with JC (Junior Certificate-three year3 of 
Secondary Shcool) to the Lesotho public service In 10.9 months. The average' 
migrant minaworker in 1975, i£ he open: tho whole year in RSA, cculd «:-n 42 
core than the starting salary of the highest entry level COSC (Cambridge 
Overseas School Certificate -High School Graduate) recruit to the Lesotho 
public service! In 197S, the picture was not much different; a surface r.cvice 
could earn the Lesotho minimum ir. 11.8 months, an underground novice could 
earn the JC entry salary in 9.7 months, and despite the large increase in COSC 
entry salaries, the average mineworker in a full year had earnings only some 
11Z lower than the top entry rate for COSC in the Lesotho public service.
The implications of these comparisons are worth exploring in detail. In 
pecuniary terms, so long as migration to minework in RSA was available, there 
was no positive pecuniary return to investment in education below the tertiary 
level. Thi3 poses problems for government policy toward education. For some
t
time, it ha3 been evident that the demand from RSA for labor from Lesotho may
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r ■ ’be reduced below the numbers willing to go, and in recant years there have at 
times been severe restrictions on recruitment. As insurance against a fall in 
demand, and for the long run, it is clearly desirable that the Lesotho 
educational system provide ctudents with skills that increase their earning 
capacity n economic activity within Lesotho. But currently, the populace 
essentially has no incentive to encourage this; from the point of view of the 
student, in solely pecuniary teres the educational system provides r.o payoff 
unless the student reaches the university level. Table 3 3hous how long the 
odds are -about SCO to 1. The education system can be compared to a lottery 
with a big payoff if you win. In these circumstances, why support changes 
(a'Jiy from a traditional academic curriculum) which may hurt your already 
small chances of that big payoff, if the advantages of the changes are 
perceived aa non-pecur.iary and uncertain? Admittedly, there are other, 
complex, historical, political, and institutional reasons why the curriculum 
remains academic and top-down influenced, but it is significant that in 
economic terms, the private returns to progress through the system are 
essentially zero unless one reaches the tertiary level;1' It is also true, as 
we shall see, that the process of progression through the system is not a 
random lottery, but one biased in favor of the children of the better-off. 
Nevertheless, in these circumstances there is no economic motivation for the 
public to press for change in the curriculum, and one can understand the 
widespread feeling in Lesotho that independence has produced few benefits for 
the population except for the university-educated elite.
The Education System
Tabla 3 spells ouc the rapidly declining enrollment ratios as a cohort 
moved through the formal education G/3 tea in Lesotho in the 60'c and 70's.
Thi3 section will briefly flesh out tha structure of the educational system, 
and provide some additional information on the costs of that system.
Formal education was introduced to Lesotho by Christian missions over a
century ago. Tha system is still dominated by various church groups, although
i
now most teachers' salaries are paid by government. The location and number 
of cchools has been affected by competition between denominations, with Che 
result that there are often several schools serving geographic ureas that 
could well be served by fever, larger schools. In 1977 there were believed to 
be around 1,056 primary 3c‘nools, serving the first seven years of schooling 
(not all schools offer tha full seven years), and 63 secondary schools, Many 
secondary schools only offer the three year"Junior Certificate course (Forms A 
through C); the fourth and fifth years (Forms D aud E), leading to the CDSC 
examination (the entry requirement Cor higher education) are available to 
only about one third of the pupils who reach Form C. 9o2 of primary schools, 
and 652 of secondary schools, are controlled by religious groups.
Schools are frequently poorly-equipped and staffed. Average class size in 
primary schools in 1977 was over 50, and 312 of teachers were unqualified. In 
1975, the accommodation for primary pupils permitted 322 to sit at desks, 262 
to sit on benches, and 1 2 to sit ou chairs, with about 412 sitting on the
*4 *
floor. 72 of classes were being held outdoors, and fully 302 of the classroom 
buildings were judged beyond repair or in need of major repairs. In many 
schools, up to 602 of pupils have no learnir.3 materials (books, etc-)
9whatsoever. Secondary schools are somewhat better in terms of average class 
site and physical facilities, but the proportion of unqualified teachers is 
similar. In 1977 there were some 1S2 expatriate teachers at this level, over 
20* of the total, and expatriates dominated mathematics and science teaching 
at the secondary level.
Two peculiarities of education is Lesotho are that females outnumber males 
among students at most levels, and that enrollment ratios at primary entering 
level (standard 1) have persistently exceeded 10031 for several years. The 
explanation of the first peculiarity is usually alleged to be connected with 
the sexual division of labor in Lesotho and consequent differences in 
opportunity costs of school attendance. Care of livestock is a mala tack; the 
absanca of large nun'snrs Of adult itsloo in KSA implies a strong damand for 
young herdboys (usually estimated at about 60,000 on average). Boys as young 
as 6 or 7 years old will occasionally be encountered herding livestock, 
although usually close to home or assisting a teenager. Herdboys are paid 
(traditionally in kind - lambs, kids, or calves - occasionally now in each) 
and the nucleus of a personal herd can be obtained by adulthood by tha 
enterprising herdboy. ■'
The excess enrollment in Standard 1 is partly explained by repeating, and 
under- and over-age acmission. However, it has persisted so long that it is 
probable that it is also connected with population flows to and from RSA.*~ 
Because of opposition to oo-eailed "Bantu education" iu RSA, and for other 
social, political, and educational reasor.c, soma Sesotho-speaking residents of 
RSA enroll their children in schools in Lesotho rather than in RSA (usually
10 1
via relatives in Lesotho with when the children stay). No quantitative 
evidence on the number of such pupilc exists end given the frequent 
anbiguitiea concerning citizenship end place of permanent residence of 
individual Sssctho in Southern Africa, such data are probably uncollectable. 
Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests, however, that there are significant 
numbers of students with closer family ties in RSA than within Lesotho at all 
levels of the primary and secondary education sy3tea.
Primary schooling in Lesotho is officially tuition-free, since 1974. The 
unlc coot to government in the late 1970's was about RiO per year. however, 
in practice all primar/ schools continue to demand payments from pupils 
for attendance, for such purposes aa registration, supplies, building 
raxintanance, cto» Those chnrjfis vary with school and standard, but mos: fall 
in the range R3 to R14 per year. At secondary level, an explicit tuition fee 
is still charged (R40 a year, officially, in 1977), and the other charges are 
much higher, averaging perhaps R75 per year with a wide range. Only a 
minority of secondary students, essentially Chose from urban families, can 
live at home (the population is about 90Z rural); the majority must either 
board (at an additional fee, around R45 to R100 a year in 1S75) or take 
lodgings with relatives or strangers.
At university level, virtually all students are on government bu^-scrics 
which cover all costs and provide a stipend. Until 1977, these bursaries were 
gifts to tfio^students, the only obligation carried by the student being to 
work for government (at normal pay scales) fcr a number of years if a post was 
offered. Since 1977, the bursary has been converted into a loin, parcially
r
remitted ir the student performs veil and/or works within the country for five 
year3 after graduation.Average costs par student-year to government for 
the three levels of formal academic education in 1977 were about R20 at the 
primary level, R95 at the secondary level, and R2,290 at the university.
There is also a National Teacher Training College and a number of 
technical training institutes, some with histories dating back to the 
nineteenth century, and pcovision for vocational training in some secondary 
schools. Neither teacher training nor technical and vocational training will 
be Lddretsed here. Th* major problem with respect to skilled manual workers 
is not training capacity, but domestic wage levels compared to those in RSA. 
Perhaps three quarters of these who have received technical training in 
Lesotho in the 1960's and 1970'b actually work in RSA rtthar than Lesotho.^ 
National University of Lesotho Students
The data in this section are drawn from the results of a survoy
administered by the author to all first-year students at the National
University of Lesotho (XUL) in early 1 9 7 6 . Tables A through 3 give some 
information on the socio— economic origins of these students.'-0
In the case of most characteristics, it is not possible to give a detailed
comparison with the relevant segments of the population as a whole, since Such
detailed data are not available for the country as. a whole. Nevertheless," it 
is abundantly clear that the studento at the university are not a 
representative group, although they do come from a broad range of 
backgrounds.
Consider first Table A, which summarizes the responses to questions 
requesting identification of the "major (most important) occupation and
economic activity" of students' fathers and mothers. A. feu saliert points 
stand cut. Over a quarter of students' fathers are either civil servants cr 
teachers, and fully half have non-agricultural occupations within Lesotho. Of 
the nale labor force as a whole, probably Iqbg than 10% have non-agricultural 
occupations within Lesotho. Close to 22Z of students' fathers work in RSA; 
given the age-group of fathers, this may not be ouch different from the 
relevant comparison group. But as many students' fathers are migrants not in 
mining 3 3 are mir.evorkers; this is strikingly different from the usual .beliefs 
about the industrial distribution cf migrants, which sjggeat only about 20" to 
30" of migrants are not raineworkers.^
However, it would be consistent with students’ fathers being drawn 
dlsproportionally from the more educated strata of the population, the
more educated and skilled are more likely fo have non—mining jobs in P."A.
Table 5 gives some information on educational attainments of students’ 
parents, compared to persons aged 30-49 at the time of the 1966 Census.^
As might be anticipated, the children cf the more educated have a much 
better chance of reaching university than the children of the less educated. 
This is dramatized by the "disparity ratios" or “selectivity indices" shown in 
columns 5 and 6. These show, fcr example, that persons whose mothers attained 
matriculation are present at the university in 75 times the numbers that they 
are in the population as a whole, whereas persons with fathers with no 
schooling at all are present at the university in only one fifth the numbers 
they are in the population as a whole. To put it another way, a child whore 
father had a unvarsity degree va3 over 200 times more likely to get to
i
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university chan one whose father had no schooling; and a child whose mother 
had a university degree was over 500 tines more likely to get to the 
university chan one whose mother had no schooling.^
Table 6 compares the data on paternal education and selectivity Indices 
for NUL students with those available from the literature on some other 
African countries. Unfortunately, most of these refer to secondary schcool 
students. Nevertheless, it is very striking to note that no other study has 
reported as strong underrepresentation of those whose fathers have no formal 
schooling as these data show for Lesotho, and Chat if the NUL data are 
recalculated to give comparability with the Ahmadu Bello data, fully 561 of 
the NIT. students’ fathers had some post primary education, compared to only 
14.2? at Ahmadu Belloj tha selectivity index for the NUL aeudento In this 
category is not calculable from available data, but is probably higher than 
the Ahmndu Bello figure of "at least fifteen". The NUL data seem to be 
consistent with the conclusions of Clignet and Foster, and O'Connell and 
Beckett, that "father's education has a still heavier,impact on the chances 
that a child will reach high educational levels than father's occupation or 
income.
No comparative data on mother's education levels are available. The NUL 
selectivity Indices, which appear to show much more influence of mother's- 
education than of father's, probably largoly reflect the well-known 
"marrying-up" phenomenon, i.e. it is likely that most mothers do not have more 
education than fathers. However, the data unfortunately do not permit an 
explicit check on whether this interpretation is correct.
t
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Tahlea 7 and 8 give some information to compare those student families 
which were engaged in agricultural activity with the rural population as a 
whole. 65Z of students claimed to he from rural areas, compared to over 902 of 
the population as a whole. Table 7 shows that the rural students' parents 
were much more likely to be engaged in cash crop production than the rural 
population as a whole, and Table 8 shows that students were drawn 
disproportionatoly from the households with larger cattle holdings (cattle are 
the main form of ruml wealth). Together, theae two tables strongly suggest 
that children of both urban and rural elites are overrepresented among 
university students.
The questionnaire also requested students to estimate their parents' joint 
total monthly oesh income, after taxes. Only 562 hazarded a response. And 
the responses are probably neither reliable nor an unbiassed sample, "or what 
it is worth, the implied mean monthly household cash income was over Rl65, 
whereas estimates of mean monthly household total income for the same period 
for the country as a whole range from R50 to about RSO. Over 252 of students 
responding reported family incomes of over R200 a month, whereas in the 
country as a whole probably less than 12 of all households had Such 
incomes.^
Unfortunately, as noted above, sufficient Information does not exfec on 
income distribution and the incidence of taxation in Lesotho to core to any 
firm conclusions about the overall effects of the education system on Income 
distribution. However, some strong indications are given by two observations. 
The first is thAt the bulk of the Lesotho government's recurrent revenue is
from Che Southern African Cuatoran Union Agreement.^ The nature of 
that agreement makaa it virtuully impossible to measure the incidence of 
indirect taxation, but it is surely not progressive. The direct pursonal 
taxation system, which accounts for lesu than 10* of tax revenue, is only 
mildly progressive. Kence it is reasonable to assume that tax incidence in 
Lesotho, across income classes, i3 at best only mildly progressive; it could 
well be proportional or even regressive.
Second, it is possible to roughly estimate the prospective rate of return 
to university education on the basis of government salary scales, tax 
schedules, and scholarship/bursary-loan practices. In 1975, using 1975 
salaries and practices, the prospective private rate of return to a university 
degree exceeded 50t; in 1978, using 1978 salaries and assuming a full-cost 
bursary is repaid in full, the prospective private rate of return was still 
about 8* (the social rate of return, assuming salaries reflect productivities, 
was still about 20Z in 1 9 7 8 ).^3
Since the pecuniary private rate of return to primary education, JC and 
COSC, assuming the opportunity cost is migrant mine work, was zero or negative 
it is strongly suggested that the education system, in conjunction with the 
labor market, is disequalizing distributionally in that it only provides 
pecuniary benefits to those who reach and complete University, and these ' 
students come disproportionately from.the higher socio-economic strata.
Conclusions
Briefly, we should note soma aspects of the causes of this situation which 
might be amenable to meliorating policy moves, The most obvious one is the
15
financing system used at high school level. Aa noted, the private costs of 
high school education aro quita high, of the order of R10Q to R150 or mora * 
year out-of-pocket plus substantial foregone earninga, at least for males. 
Table 9 summarizes tha sources of finance for high school coats for NUL 
students. Although this table only gives the proportion of students 
identifying each cource as used, not any indication of the quantitative 
contributions to total costa from each 3ource, Table 9 together with other
j
information makes clear that families are the most important sources of 
finance for 6tudents in high school. No information is available on the 
socio-economic composition of those completing primary school compared to 
those completing high school, but obviously the cost of high school will be a 
much greater barrier to low income families than to high income families. It 
would appear, therefore, chat one step which would improve the equity of the 
situation would be to extend the loan-bursary scheme to the high school level 
as suggested by the JASPA r e p o r t . T h e  only problem with this idea is that 
the current prospective pecuniary private return to secondary edu:st'-on for 
males is essentially zero, assuming the possibility of migration work in 
RSA c o n t i n u e s . G i v e n  the observation that this possibility appears to te 
contracting relatively rapidly as the employers in RSA reduce their foreign 
labor components and attempt to stabilize the composition of their migrant 
work forces (via "re-engagement certificates," etc.),25 this suggests that 
attention has to be focused more directly on the interactions between formal 
education, economic productivity, and wage and salary policies. Some 
meliorative policy steps could be taken, in terras of a more equitable
i
geographic distribution of facilities and resources in secondary education,
\
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but In the peculiar circumstances of Lesotho it seems doubtful that a 
meliorative set of policies will have much impact on the basic disequalizing 
process, and is quite likely to introduce further distortions (e.g. the loan 
bursary scheme extended to high school level would increase the demand for 
high school places, but if the graduates cannot find remunerative domestic 
employment, the loans may be uncollectable). What kind of policy could 
prevent a disequalizing effect from formal education in the Lesotho context 1* 
unclear, but it is very probable it would require radical change rather than 
aollorattv« policy. Of course, government may not in fact be interested avan 
in meliorative policy. Tha establishment of an elite private secondary 
school, Xnchabeng, attended by the children of government ministers among 
others of the elite, and Intended presumably to improve its pupils chances of 
entry to tertiary education, suggests that the groups controlling the state 
may not be interested in reducing inequality of opportunity. Disequalization 
via the education system is likely to continue as long as educational 
credentials remain the major determinant of access to local Jobs and initial 
incomes from employment. As has been argued elsewhere, It is likely that 
increasing inequality of incomes within Lesotho is unavoidable without major 
changes in the wider Southern African economy, because of the highly dependent 
nature of Lesotho's relationship with RSA.^
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Probable Labor-Force Status of Working-age Population, Lesotho, 1976 
(Thousands of persons)
TABLE 1
Age 10-64 Age 15-64 •
Male Female Total Male Female Total
De Jura Population 409 418 807 314 340 654
Lesn in South Africa 1 129 24 153 129 24 153
Lenn In School 39 84 143 13 35 34
Less disabled and 
females economically 
inactive | 11 25 36 10 30 40
Lass employed for
wages 21 14 35 18 12 30
Less employed in 
handicrafts and 
informal sector 12 13 25 12 13 . 25
Available for work as | 
self-employed or 
unpaid family workers I 
etc. 1571 258 415 127 225 352
Sources ILO, JASPA, Options for a Deoendent Fconomv (Addis Ababa: TLO,
1978), Tables 2.3, 2.6, based on the 1976 Population Census and other
estimates.
#
I. This Includes probably about 30,000mine workers 'resting' between 
contracts In South Africa.
<
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Initial Salary Levels, New Entrant* to Lesotho Public Service
Rand Per Annua
Table 2
Quali cation Clerical Crades Technical Grades
197 5
Unskilled (no Qualifica­
tions) 360
Junior Certificate or GCE* 624 672
COSC 3rd Class 672 720
COSC 2nd or 1st Class 864 912
Bachelor’s degree 2892
*"It is only when candidates who hold COSC are not available that applicants 
with only JC can be considered for appointment.*'
Source: Personal Communication from N.S. Bereng, Chief 
Cabinet (Personnel), Government of Lesotho, 10
Personnel Officer, 
October 1975.
1978
Unskilled (no qualification) 600
J.C. 744 /
COSC, J.C. + 2 years Technical Training 1704* •
University Graduate (Bachelor's
degree) 3840
•Highest possible entry level.
One rand - U.S. $1.15 in late 1975 and throughout 1978.
Source: ILO, JASPA, Options for a Dependent Economy (Addis Ababat ILO, JASFA,
1978), Table 7.7.
-  T 7 ■. w r > » i  " r ' T ' T " * * . '  » ■ !  ■ ' i .u  . . . "  < ■ ■  i i . p ' u n . i  n  i 1.1
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Table 3
The Education Tyramld for the Cohort Entering School In 1965
Year Number As 1 of 
Previous 
Level
As 2 of 
1965 
Standard 1
Enrollment, Standard 1 
(Primary) 1965 52,000
Enrollment, Standard 7 1971 10,990 21 21
Passes from Standard 7 1971 6,370 53 12
Enrollment, Form A i 
(Secondary) 1972 4,572 72 9
Enrollment, Form C . 1974 3,330 73 6
Passes Form C (JC) 1974 2,169 65 4
Enrollment, Form D 1975 1,137 • 52 2
Enrollment, Form E 1976 . 1,113 98 2
Passes from Form E
(COSC) 1976 340 31 0.7
Enrollment, University 
year 1 1977 89 26 0.2
Note: School year Is calendar year; University academic year start3 In
August; repeaters are included. . .
Source: ILO, JASPA Options for a Dependent Economy (Addis Ababa: ILO, JASPA,
^ 9 7 8 ) ,  Table 7.2
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Occupational Distribution of Parents of NUL Citizen 
First-year Students, 1975-76
X
Fathers Mothers
Table 4
Self-employed farner 19.1 0
Teacher 14.5 2.7
Civil Servant 11.8 1.8
Professional or Managerial 3.6 . 0.9
Nurse 0 8.0
Employee, Private Sector 8.2 5.3
Self-employed 9.1 10.6
Mine Worker in RSA 10.9 0
Other Employee in RSA 10.9 1.8
Housewife 0 64.6
Retired, Sick, Disabled 6.4 3.5
Other 5.5 0.9
Source: Student questionnaire
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Table 5
Educational Attainments and Selectivity Indices, NUL 
Student Parents and Comparison Group
Higheot Level 
of Education
1
Fathers
Z
2
Mothers
Z
3
Male Comp. 
Croup Z
4
Female Comp. 
Group Z
5
Male
Index
1/3
6
Female
Ir.dcx
2/4
No School at all 9.2 3.8 45.3 21.5 0.20 0.18
Junior Certifi­
cate 19.3 11.3 2.0 0.4 9.65 2P.15
Matriculation 8.3 • 7.5 0.6 0.1 13.33 75.00
University 
Decree »
I
6.3 1.9 0.2 0.02 M .  5 95.00
Comparison groups arc the de facto males and females aged 30—'*9 in 1966, 
from the 1966 Census Report.
Totals do not add to 100Z since several levels of education are omitted 
because of non-comparability between the questionnaire data classes and 
the Censue data classes.
r 23Table 6
Comparison of Selectivity Indices for Some African Student 
Populations, Based on Paternal Education
Educational
Level
Lesotho, NUL, 1976 
X of Selectivity 
Fathers Index
Ghana, Secondary 
Schools, 1961 
X Fathers Index
Kenya, Form IV, 
1961
X Fathers Index
No Formal Educa­
tion 9.2 0.20 27.6 0.4 30.5
Junior Certifi­
cate 19.3 9.65 29.3 2.5 )
HatrIculation 8.3 13.83 11.8 8.4
) 3.7
)
Unlv«r»lc7
Degree 8.3 41.5 5.3 17.7 0.6
0.4
3.3
6.0
Educa tionsl Kenya, Form IV, Northern Nigeria Ivory Coast Secondary
Level 1968 Ahmadu Bello Univ. Schools, Early 60's
1970/71
X Fathers Index X Father* Index X Fathers
No Formal Educa-| 34.4 0.5 35.1 0.41 . 69.1
tion
Junior Certifl- I ) )
cate ) 7.1 7.1 )
Matriculation | ) ) 14.2 15.0 10.7
Unlver3i ty 1.0 10.0 )
Degree
•
[Sotes and Sources on next page]
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Table 6 continued
Comparison of Selectivity Indices for Sotae African Student 
Populations, Based on Paternal Education
Note: the selectivity indent used in each source has been retained;
the comparison groups diffur somewhat from source to source.
Sources: Ghana: Philip T. Foster, “Secondary Schooling and Social
Mobility in a West African Nation," Sociology of Education 37:2 
(Winter 1963): 160. JC has been equated to "Middle Schooi" and 
Matriculation to "Secondary School"
Kenyai Jerry Olson, "Secondary School* and Elites in Kenya: A 
ComparnC-lv# Study of Students in 1961 end 1968," Cooperative education 
flovjqw Id 11 (l972)i SI, JC and Hacrlc have been «q u aTTeTt o"^i*2* '
years of school, university degree to 13 or more years of school.
Northern Nigeria: Janes O'Connell and Paul A. Beckett, "Soclai 
Characteristics of an el ite-*in-formation: the case of Nigerian 
University Students" British Journal of Sociology 26:3 (1976): 
324-325. JC, Matric, and university degree have been equated to their 
"above primary," and the selectivity index recalculated from the 
discussion in the text.
Ivory Coast: from R. ?. Clignet and P, Foster, The Fortunate Few: A 
Study of Secondary Schools and Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966), as quoted (and adapted) in 
O'Connell and Beckett.
*
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Crops reported grown by parents of student* compared to 
crops reported grown on all landholdings in the 1970 Agricultural Census*
Table 7
- X of Students Reporting Parents Growing, 1975
Z of All Landholdings 
Growing, 1970
Ma i ze 88.9Z 65.5Z
Sorghum 40.3X 50.7 Z
Vhea t 33.3Z 39.5Z
Peas 33.3Z 12 .AX
Beans 76.4Z 9.95Z
Lucerne 4.2Z -
Potatoes 32.4X 4.IX
(Seans, peas and potatoes were the three most important cash crops In the 
1970's)
Source: Student questonnaire; Z's are of students whose parents held land
(53.5% of all students; landlessness among student families seems 
high —  in general, only about 15Z of all Lesotho households ara 
usually estimated to be landless - but may be explained by tha high 
proportion - 351 - of students claiming urban residence).
26 
Table 8
Size Distribution of Cattle-Holdings by Parents 
Reported by NUL Students
No. of 
Cattle
No. of 
Reports
Z of 
Reports
I of Cattle 
Reported
Z of Cattle, 1970 
Agric. Census, In Same 
Size-Clafi3 of Poldlrc
1-3 29 52 16 30
6-10 1 13 23 22 32
11-20 9 16 28 22
21 or more 3 9 34 1 ’»
Source! Student Questionnaire.
27 
Table 9
Source* of Finance for High School, NUL 1st Year Student* 1975/76
Parents 91Z
Brothers and
Sisters 11.6Z
Uncle and Aunt 6.3Z
Own Earning*/
Savings 11.At
Church 9.8Z
Government of •
Lesotho 9.5Z
Save the Children
Fund 8.2 X
Others 6.?X
Note: Total adds to more than 100Z siace students were told to 
answer for all who helped. **
Source: Student questionnaire.
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